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Abstract
In this paper we empirically investigate a possible transmission of the European
business cycle to Sub-Saharan Africa’s economies. This linkage may be of interest
because the EMU is the main trading partner of African countries, and many of
these countries use the euro as either the oﬃcial or a de facto anchor in order to keep
the exchange rate ﬁxed or stable. After identifying possible theoretical channels of
transmission, we test whether the relevant economic variables in Africa are sensitive
to the ﬂuctuations of European economic activity. Using either a Euro area GDP
series or a Stock and Watson approach in order to build indicators of economic
ﬂuctuations in the EMU, we ﬁnd limited transmission of these ﬂuctuations to
Sub-Saharan Africa despite the appealing theoretical linkages between the two
areas. The most important relationship we manage to disentangle is between the
European and African monetary policies.
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A growing amount of literature has addressed the external eﬀects of the EMU for
developing countries in many aspects. For example, on the real side, Ruhashyankiko
(1999) studied the link between the volatility of European currencies exchange rates and
the economic performance in the Middle East and North Africa, while Levy Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2000) and Benassy-Qu´ er´ e and Lar` eche-R´ evil (2000), on the monetary
side, investigated the implications of the euro for the Latin American ﬁnancial sector
and the anchorage of the Central and Eastern Europe currencies, respectively. Some
theoretical papers (Hadjimichael and Galy, 1997; Konate, 2001; Nyembwe, 2003) have
tried to assess the implications of the advent of the euro on the African countries.
But, as far as we know, there is no study devoted to a rigorous empirical analysis of the
relationships between the EMU and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), despite the importance
of the European Union as the main trading partner of African countries.
Since the EMU is the main importer of African exports and the main supplier
of African imports, its economic activity ﬂuctuations are likely to have a substantial
impact on the SSA economic activity. There is an extensive body of literature that pro-
vides the empirical evidence of a European business cycle (EBC) and national business
cycles “convergence” in the EMU. See for instance Angeloni and Dedola (1999), Artis
and Zhang (1999), Holmes (2002) and Artis et al. (2003). The “convergence” we are
interested in means the degree of synchronicity of national business cycles. Combining
this evidence with the linkages that are thought to exist on theoretical grounds be-
tween the EMU and the SSA, one may wonder whether the EMU business cycle aﬀects
African countries. The answer to this question depends on whether we will be able to
show empirically that the two regions are actually linked to an extent that allows for
economic interactions. If links are evinced with data, a deeper convergence of Euro-
pean economies — if changes in the magnitude and the speed of economic ﬂuctuations
occurs in EMU — will be likely to matter for SSA’s countries.
Both EMU and African economic series are going to be used to compute cross-
correlation coeﬃcients for several leads and lags as well as to perform Granger causality
tests, following in this Ag´ enor et al. (2000). The use of cross-correlation coeﬃcients
is largely accepted in the empirical business cycle literature (see also Kydland and
Prescott, 1990; Fiorito and Kollintzas, 1994). But, as Ag´ enor et al. (2000) recognized,
these coeﬃcients do not imply causal relationships. In our study, we consider diﬀe-
rent types of results. First, an evidence provided by a maximum correlation coeﬃcient
suggesting a leading eﬀect of a European variable will be accepted if it is either ac-
companied by a signiﬁcant contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcient or conﬁrmed by the
Granger causality test result. Secondly we will also accept the evidence provided by
the case of synchronous cycles of European and SSA’s country variables, when the
contemporaneous correlation is signiﬁcant at 10% level (at least). Indeed, the Granger
test does not consider the contemporaneous correlation.
In order to capture the EMU economic activity we use either a classical Euro area
variable or a Stock & Watson indicator whenever it is possible. We attempt to use the
linear dynamic factor model (Stock and Watson, 1989) methodology to build indicators
1of the EBC. Since the GDP series of European economies we obtained are cointegrated,
we simply used a classical GDP series of EMU to capture the cyclical behavior of
European GDP. The linear dynamic model is then used only for European wholesale
and consumer prices.
The usual Stock and Watson indicator of economic activity is estimated for various
relevant variables of a national economy, especially industrial production, real personal
income, real manufacturing and trade sales and ﬁnally, total employee-hours in non-
agricultural establishments. This composite index is interesting in the sense that it
appears to be a common component featuring the various series used. Thus, we consider
that this “common component” is, to some extent, the implication of business cycles
convergence if its impact on national series is signiﬁcant. We then ﬁt composite indexes
with similar variables of EMU country-members’ economies instead of various series of
only one national economy. We then capture the common component of the economic
activity in EMU which is insulated from idiosyncratic components.
This is why such a common component could be, to some extent, more interesting
than a classical Euro area variable. Indeed, classical aggregate series — for example
Euro area GDP — are weighted by the economic size of various countries. This is of less
interest for us in the sense that we look for only the common component from various
European economies. Conversely, one can argue that using the common component
means a loss of information because the various economies do not symmetrically inﬂu-
ence each other, the big economies having a greater impact on the EBC. It also needs
to be noticed that the European cycle is correlated with those of other industrialized
economies, namely the United States economy. Insulating the speciﬁc European com-
ponent from the others is widely outside the scope of this study and deserves further
research.
The originality of our study is twofold. On one the hand, it extends the empirical
literature on business cycle to speciﬁc SSA’s countries, despite the scarcity of reliable
data to build business cycles indicators of African economies. The issue is tackled by
identifying possible theoretical channels of transmission in order to study the correla-
tion between the EBC indicators and some variables of transmission for which we can
obtain appropriate data. The task here is to answer the question whether the empirical
evidence on the external impact of the developed country’s economic activity could
be conﬁrmed when considering individually small SSA’s countries. For example, Kose
and Riezman (2001) found a weak but positive impact of industrial country GDP on
some middle income DCs, while Hoﬀmaister et al. (1998a) showed that the “North”
greatly inﬂuences the GDP of an aggregate “South”. On the other hand, we contribute
to the growing body of literature on the EMU by adding a piece of work that treats
the external eﬀects of economic activity in Europe on the small African developing
countries.
Ag´ enor et al. (2000) have empirically tested the relationship between a common
business cycle of industrial countries and those of some middle-income DCs and found
that, regardless of the detrending method used, a weak but positive robust correlation
holds and indicates a relatively rapid transmission of output ﬂuctuations in industrial
countries to developing country’s economies. While Kouparitsas (1996) found that the
2South is aﬀected by shocks originating in the North, Hoﬀmaister et al. (1998a) argued
that the resilience of the South1 to the industrialized countries’ business cycle is mainly
due to Asian economies than to the “Other South”. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
results of Kose et al. (2003) who found that the correlations of output growth rates of
DCs and their composite measure of world output declined in the nineties. Moreover,
among DCs, the decline is more pronounced for the more ﬁnancially integrated group of
economies, i.e. “the emerging markets”, than for the less ﬁnancially integrated group.
What is also interesting to note from the existing literature is the fact that, as the
comovements of business cycles can theoretically be explained by trade and ﬁnancial
linkages (Kose and Yi, 2001; Kose et al., 2003), Kose et al. (2003) found that their
(empirical) eﬀect on output correlations appears to be stronger for industrial countries
than for developing countries. Calderon et al. (2002) also found that trade linkages have
a more important impact on the comovement of business cycles in advanced countries
than in DCs.
All the results are presented either for DCs as a whole or for various groups of DCs.
Thus, it is interesting to examine whether the SSA’s countries, individually considered,
are sensitive to the economic ﬂuctuations of their main trading partner — the EMU.
The choice of SSA’s countries we retain in our study is due to the availability of
data. But most of these countries are located in Western and Central Africa. Moreover,
many of them belong to the zone franc that we sometimes call CFA zone. It follows
that our group of African economies retained is quite homogeneous. Let us keep in
mind that when invoking the SSA’s countries, we are referring to a limited group of
Sub-Saharan African countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section two, we highlight the
plausible theoretical channels of transmission, basing ourselves on previous studies.
We also review the empirical literature devoted to the EBC in order to determine the
extent to which the convergence of business cycles in Europe deserves our attention.
Section three presents the data while Section four describes the methodology we use
to investigate the empirical link between the European economic activity and selected
African economies. In the ﬁfth section we build cyclical economic activity indicators
and we perform correlation analysis and Granger causality tests before the ﬁnal section
concludes through a summary of our ﬁndings.
2 North-South Linkages and Business Cycles in the EMU
This section is devoted to identifying the plausible economic linkages between EMU
and SSA in order to highlight the possible EBC’s channels of transmission to SSA’s
economies. We provide some key demand and supply-side spillover channels that are
likely to explain the trade and ﬁnancial markets-induced transmission of business cy-
cles. It will then be possible to determine which relationships could be empirically
1Hoﬀmaister et al. (1998a) split up the South in two components in order to reﬁne their empirical
investigation of North-South economic interactions. On the one hand, they considered Asia, and, on
the other hand, the rest of developing countries they called Other South.
3investigated, as quarterly data time series on Africa’s economic activity are scarce. On
the other hand, we investigate the empirical EBC literature to ascertain the extent to
which the business cycle in the Euro area deserves our attention.
2.1 North-South Asymmetric Interactions: Channels of Transmission
to the Sub-Saharan Africa
Despite the increasing economic interdependence between industrial countries and de-
veloping countries (Vines and Currie, 1995), the economic interactions between Sub-
Saharan economies and the EMU remain a one-way dependence. The reason is twofold:
on one hand, the increasing importance of the South in the world economy is mainly
due to the development in Asian and Latin American economies rather than the growth
in African countries (Hoﬀmaister et al., 1998a)2. Even if some of these countries are
oil-exporters, — notably Angola, Cameroon, Gabon and Nigeria — their importance
as price makers in the petroleum industry is insigniﬁcant. On the other hand, the
development of the ﬁnancial integration that increased interactions between the North
and the South (Hoﬀmaister et al., 1998a) is almost non-existing in SSA. The emerging
ﬁnancial markets, which become increasingly important for Northern ﬁnancial markets,
are located outside of Africa.
Therefore, it is easy enough to describe a framework of interaction between the
EMU economic activity and the Sub-Saharan economies. We will disentangle various
channels of transmission with the help of existing theoretical and empirical studies on
the North-South economic interdependence, in order to determine the economic links
which will be tested empirically.
Direct Demand Shock to the Exports
This channel is largely invoked in the literature. Increased output in the industrialized
countries is likely to increase the demand of DCs exports, leading to a greater correlation
of outputs and then a comovement of business cycles (Kose et al., 2003). It follows
that this channel of economic shocks transmission implies an unambiguously positive
correlation of BCs. But, as stressed by Kose and Yi (2001) and Kose et al. (2003),
trade linkages can, on the other hand, induce a decrease of the degree of business cycles
comovement, when considering the supply side. Indeed, if stronger trade linkages lead
to an increased specialization of production, the subsequent inter-industry pattern that
is expected — according to the classical trade theory — will cause economies to be
diﬀerently aﬀected by industry speciﬁc shocks. This is likely to decrease the degree of
business cycles comovements.
The SSA’s economies are open and are hence sensitive to the changes in the value of
exports and imports. Analyzing a sample of 22 African economies including 18 SSA’s
economies, Kose and Riezman (2001) highlight that the average Exports/GDP ratio
2Hoﬀmaister et al. (1998a) found the evidence of a structural break in the North-South relationships.
Since 1988, the South has become more resilient to the North business cycle, while the latter has become
more sensitive to growth of the former.
4is 30.8%. They also note that average Imports/GDP and (Imports+Exports)/GDP
ratios are respectively 40.4 and 71.1. Accordingly, we argue that ﬂuctuations of eco-
nomic activity in the EMU are likely to have an impact on SSA’s country’s GDP in a
Keynesian-like framework if the European demand for imports is aﬀected. Indeed, the
EU is the main trading partner of most SSA’s countries for its share in the total SSA’s
exports is either the largest or major.
The Role of Terms of Trade and Relative Prices
The terms of trade (TT) or relative prices changes act also as channels through which
the economic activity abroad aﬀects the economies of developing countries. As there
could be an export supply response to changing export prices, the impact of TT could
also work through an income eﬀect that could lead to changes in the domestic demand3
(see Kouparitsas, 1996). Thus, an improvement of a country’s TT is expected to induce
an improvement of net exports and GDP.
On the other hand, since capital goods and inputs compose the main part of SSA’s
imports, a price increase of one of these goods will act like a negative shock on the
output. Hoﬀmaister et al. (1998b), for example, stresses that an increase in the price
of intermediate inputs is similar to a negative technological progress. The variable
of interest to capture this channel of transmission is the ratio of imported foreign
inputs and capital goods prices to domestic producer prices since we are interested in
looking for the possible impact of a shock in the prices of these imported goods on
SSA’s economies. In our study, classical TT — ratio of export price to import price
— are not suitable to investigate this channel of transmission because SSA’s countries
essentially export primary goods that are not produced for domestic consumption. An
increase of domestic relative producer prices, i.e. the decrease of relative foreign prices
of inputs and capital goods, is expected to induce an increase of the African economy
production.
Whether the GDP of EMU aﬀects positively the Sub-Saharan African country GDPs
through this channel depends on the procyclical or the countercyclical behavior of prices
in EMU. In fact, there is in the economic literature, a lasting debate on the cyclical
behavior of prices. There is no clearcut consensus since both the countercyclical and
the procyclical behavior of prices in industrial economies are documented through a
substantial literature (See Ag´ enor et al., 2000, and references therein).
Using a variance decomposition method, Kose and Riezman (2001) found that the
trade shocks account for approximately 45% of the variation in the aggregate output
of many African countries. This impact works through changes in the relative prices of
capital goods (almost 25%) and in the relative prices of intermediate goods (less than
20%). In addition, they found that these shocks largely explain the variability of aggre-
gate investment in Africa. This is because the imported capital goods represent the bulk
of investment goods in the primary good production sector. Additional evidence of the
impact of terms of trade is provided by Hoﬀmaister et al. (1998b) who found that terms
3It has to be noticed that an improvement of TT caused by a decrease of import prices is likely to
induce an increase of imports instead of the domestic production.
5of trade have some impact on the output of Sub-Saharan African countries, even if this
impact is stronger in CFA franc country group than in the non-CFA group. Thus, the
TT could be considered as a relevant candidate for a channel through which economic
ﬂuctuations in the EMU area are transmitted to SSA’s economies. These constitute
the imported supply shock side of business cycles in Africa — see also Kouparitsas
(1996) for a link between prices of Northern capital goods and the Southern imports
and production.
The Role of Interest Rates
An increase in the world interest rates is likely to induce a decline of output in de-
veloping countries, as it could imply a heavier debt burden. On the other hand, if
African countries were integrated enough in the world ﬁnancial market, an increase of
the world interest rates could result in capital outﬂows that would lead to a decrease
in investments. Hoﬀmaister et al. (1998b) argue, for example, that an increase in the
world interest rates “...tends to have a contractionary eﬀect on total GDP...” because
of the equality between the capital/labor ratio and the world interest rate assumed in
the classical framework under perfect capital mobility.
Hoﬀmaister et al. (1998b) provided some evidence of world interest rate impact on
African countries of the CFA zone, while Ag´ enor et al. (2000) found a positive relation
between some middle-income developing country economies and a weighted index of
interest rates in industrial countries4. Contrary to the preceding empirical results,
Kose and Riezman (2001) found no signiﬁcant impact of the shocks in the world real
interest rate on African economic activity. Their study suggests that the world real
interest account for less than 1% of output volatility. But as they argued, this result
could be due to the use of a model with an incomplete asset market or due to the small
size of the sample they used. Depending on the extent of ﬁnancial integration of EMU
and African countries, it could be expected that EMU interest rates are likely to have
an impact on SSA’s economies.
Monetary Links and Business Cycles
It is known that a pegging country policymaker looks for credibility through the adop-
tion of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. In this case, the discretion of conducting monetary
policy is lost since the targeted inﬂation becomes that of the anchor country. Aban-
doning the exchange rate as a stabilizing macroeconomic tool leads to a conformity of
monetary policy. Thus, asymmetric shocks tend to diminish (De Grauwe, 1997), as
shocks could be transmitted from one economy to another. The monetary integration
is then likely to create a convergence of business cycles. Considering this possible im-
plication of monetary integration and the European project to form a monetary union,
many authors have undertaken to investigate the possible link between exchange rate
4Ag´ enor et al. (2000) argued that an expected negative eﬀect could have been muted by the indirect
opposite impact of aggregate activity in industrial economies as the interest rates are procyclical.
6regimes and the synchronization in business cycles. In the next section we provide
references on the empirical evidence of the European business cycle existence.
There are 14 Sub-Saharan African countries belonging to the franc zone which form
two monetary unions whose currencies — two diﬀerent currencies both called franc
CFA — are pegged to the euro. Two other African countries (Comoros and Cape
Verde) have separately linked their currencies to the euro through a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime. Additionally, there is another group of Western Africa’s countries engaged
in a process of monetary integration with some franc zone members — inﬂuenced by
the EMU monetary policy — in order to form a new monetary union (Masson and
Patillo, 2001). Thus, we retain here the exchange rate regime — or monetary policy —
as a possible channel of the Euro area business cycle transmission to African economies.
2.2 Empirics of Business Cycles in EMU
Before addressing the issue of a possible impact of the EBC — or simply economic
activity — on small African countries, it makes sense to inquire about the existence of
a common Eurozone cycle and to check whether a convergence is really taking place or
not. As these issues are somewhat outside the scope of our study, we limit ourselves
to reviewing the existing empirical literature devoted to the EBC and the convergence
issue. In our study we stick to two broad deﬁnitions of business cycle — a classical
cycle and a growth cycle. Following Massman and Mitchell (2003) we call “classical
cycles” the cycles that are deﬁned in terms of turning points in the original series while
“growth cycles” mean “deviations” from a trend.
Table 1: Summary of empirical studies on EBC and convergence
Existence of EBC Convergence of BC
Yes No Yes No
1. Classical cycle (including growth rates based cycles)
Artis et al. (2003) x x
Dueker and Wesche (1999) x
Harding and Pagan (2001) x
Krolzig (2001) x
Massman and Mitchell (2003) x
Ormerod and Mounﬁeld (2002) x x
2. Growth cycle
Artis et al. (2003) x x
Artis and Zhang (1999) x x
Agresti and Monjon (2001) x
Harding and Pagan (2001) x x
Holmes (2002) x x
Inklaar and de Haan (2001) x
Krolzig (2001) x
Massman and Mitchell (2003) x
Artis & Zang(1997) x x
3. Miscellani
Angeloni and Dedola (1999) x x
Note: Harding and Pagan (2001) found a very weak correlation between European business cyles.
We interpret their ﬁnding as a lack of robust evidence of the classical EBC existence.
7Table 1 shows that almost all the studies reviewed admit the existence of the EBC,
and most of them conclude that a convergence of country speciﬁc business cycles is or
has been in place.
It appears from the empirical evidence that the emergence of a EBC is justiﬁed
by data and we could reasonably expect the European economies to further converge.
Finding any empirical evidence of the EBC indicators’ impact on African economic
variables means suggesting that further convergence of European country cycles could
matter for Africa; as we are going to interpret these indicators as measures of the
common component of the converging European country economies.
3 Data
In this paper, we consider the relationships between the real and monetary sectors
of the European and African economies. On the “real side” we have GDP, relative
wholesale prices, terms of trade, income terms of trade5 and real exports, whereas on
the “monetary side” we have the consumer price index; it is used as an indicator of
monetary policy. The economic relationships that we will examine are summarized in
Table 2.
While looking for a possible BCs comovement, one of the accurate correlations to
study is that of GDPs. But the lack of quarterly GDP series of SSA’s countries make
us consider second best solutions. First, we analyze the interactions between annual
GDPs of the EMU and some SSA’s countries for which data are available. Then, we
simply focus on some channels of transmission for which available data are found to
provide appropriate proxies. The analysis based on quarterly data turns out to be an
empirical investigation of the various channels we highlighted above. As noticed in the
preceding section, the expected sign of some studied relations is ambiguous because the
behavior of some variables of interest can be either procyclical or countercyclical.
Table 2: Directions of analysis
Europe Africa sign
Annual series
Real GDP → Real GDP +/−
Wholesale prices (rel-
ative)
→ Real GDP −
Quarterly series
Real GDP → Terms of trade +/−
Real GDP → Income terms of trade +/−
Real GDP → Real exports +
Consumer prices → Consumer prices +
We do not take into account the interest rates we considered as a possible channel
5Income terms of trade here are the nominal African exports divided by the European export price
index.
8of transmission because using the various measures usually encountered as proxies for
world real interest rates will not add any information in comparison with the existing
literature. Blankenau et al. (2001) stress that there is no consensus on a good proxy
for the ex-ante world interest rate. The LIBOR, for example was found to be highly
correlated with the US 3-month T-bill rate and a weighted average of several countries
T-Bill rates (Blankenau et al., 2001). Moreover, we face a data restriction as long and
usable series of investment and debt service of African economies are not available.
Tables 3 and 4 show the availability of the data for each of the countries included in
our analysis.
Table 3: Availability of the data: African countries
Country Available data
Real GDP TT ITT Real exports Nominal exports CPI
Angola — 1980:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 —
Benin 1970-2000 1980:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 —
Burkina Faso 1978-2002 — 1981:1-2000:3 — 1981:1-2000:3 1983:4-2001:4
2002:2-2002:4
Cameroon 1969-1997 1980:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1980:1-2000:3 1980:1-2000:3 1970:2-2002:4
Congo 1960-2000 1980:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 —
Ivory Coast — 1980:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1970:2-2002:4
Gabon — 1980:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1970:2-2000:4
Gambia — — 1981:1-2000:3 — — 1970:2-2001:1
Ghana 1968-1997 — — — — 1970:2-2002:4
Guinea — 1980:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 —
Madagascar 1968-1997 — 1981:1-2000:3 — 1980:1-2000:3 1970:2-2002:4
Mali — 1980:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 —
Niger — 1980:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1970:2-2002:4
Nigeria 1969-2001 — 1981:1-2000:3 — 1981:1-2000:3 1970:2-2001:2
2001:4-2002:4
Rwanda 1968-2001 — — — — —
Senegal 1968-2001 — 1981:1-2000:3 — 1981:1-2000:3 1970:2-2002:4
Sierra Leone 1971-2000 — 1981:1-2000:3 — 1981:1-2000:3 —
Togo 1970-2000 1980:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1981:1-2000:3 1970:2-1994:4
1995:3-2002:4
Source: see Appendix 7.A.
Table 4: Data used for European countries
Country Available data
Real GDP (annual) Wholesale prices Real GDP (quarterly) CPI
(annual)
Austria 1970-2002 1965-1998 1980:1-2000:2 1970:2-2003:3
Belgium 1970-2002 - 1980:1-2000:2 1970:1-2003:3
Finland 1970-2002 1965-1998 1980:1-2000:2 1970:2-2003:3
France 1970-2002 1965-1998* 1980:1-2000:2 1970:2-2003:3
Germany 1970-2002 1965-1998 1980:1-2000:2 1970:2-2003:3
Italy 1970-2002 - 1980:1-2000:2 1970:2-2003:3
Ireland 1970-2002 1965-1998 1980:1-2000:2 1970:2-2003:3
Netherlands 1970-2002 1965-1998 1980:1-2000:2 1970:2-2003:3
Portugal 1970-2002 - 1980:1-2000:2 1970:2-2003:3
Spain 1970-2002 1965-1998 1980:1-2000:2 1970:2-2003:3
Euro area 1970-2002 - 1980:1-2003:3 1971:1-2002:4
* :For France, wholesale prices are replaced by export unit value series.
Source: see Appendix 7.A.
Details on data sources are provided in Appendix.
94 Methodology
We investigate the economic relations of interest by conducting the cross-correlation
and Granger-causality analysis with the economic variables mentioned in Table 2.
The cross-correlation analysis implies estimating the cross-correlation coeﬃcients
ρ(j), between the European (Xt±j) and African (Yt) economic variables at diﬀerent
lags and leads (j ∈ 0,±1,±2,...). Following for example, Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994)
and Ag´ enor et al. (2000), we plan to ﬁgure out the lagging (j > 0) or leading (j < 0)
relationships between the variables in question6. Since signiﬁcance tests can not be
performed for the maximum cross-correlation coeﬃcient, we choose to accept a leading
eﬀect only when the lag (negative) is accompanied by a signiﬁcant contemporaneous
correlation coeﬃcient.
Of course, “lead” does not mean “cause”. We then perform a Granger causality
tests in order to either conﬁrm or invalidate (when the sens of causality is the opposite
of what is expected) the leading impact of European variables. However, when the lag
of the maximum correlation coeﬃcient is “0”, and this coeﬃcient (ρ(0)) is signiﬁcant
at at least the 10% level, we conclude that the European and the African variable
cycles are synchronous, the leading impact of the European variable being possible.
Indeed, the Granger causality test does not capture the contemporaneous relationships
of variables.
The aim of the Granger-causality analysis is to gain knowledge about the causality
mechanisms linking the European and African economies. We are eager to know which
European economic variables cause the African economic variables, and what is the
delay between the “cause” and the “eﬀect”.
The Granger causality is deﬁned in the following way: a variable, Yt, is said to be
Granger-caused by another variable, Xt, if we can improve the forecasts of the former
by using the latter as a regressor and not only the past values of the former variable.
There can be a two-way Granger causality when both variables cause each other. The
formal test of the Granger causality hypothesis requires estimating the following linear
regression equation. Suppose we regress variable Yt on its own past values and on the
past values of Xt:
Yt = α0 + α1Yt−1 + ... + αpYt−p + β1Xt−1 + ... + βpXt−p + εt, (1)
where α0,α1,...,αp,β1,...,βp are the regression coeﬃcients, p is the lag order and εt
is the error term.
The Granger causality test then amounts to testing the following hypothesis: β1 =
β2 = ... = βp = 0. The null hypothesis states that there is no Granger causality. In
the same way we can test whether Yt Granger causes Xt. To make a decision about
the existence or absence of the Granger causality, we estimate the bivariate vector
autoregressions (VARs), using the 10% signiﬁcance level.
6A drawback of this methodology is that the results are likely to depend on the number of lags
included in the analysis. That is why the choice of this number has to be consistent with an acceptable
economic view.
10Of course, the concept of causality is a very rich one and is by no means limited
to Granger’s deﬁnition. Among other deﬁnitions of causality we can mention that of
Dufour et al. (2004) and that of Breitung and Candelon (2004). Dufour et al. (2004)
test the hypothesis of non-causality at various forecasting horizons, not just one, as
in the standard Granger causality deﬁnition. Breitung and Candelon (2004) test the
hypothesis of causality at diﬀerent frequencies. Both approaches are very promising,
especially the former one, which permits the determination of the delays at which the
policy in one country causes changes in the economy of other country. However, the
severe lack of suﬃciently long data series does not allow us to take advantage of these
two approaches.
Besides the time series of the individual countries, we construct the corresponding
aggregates at the European level in order to see the general impact of European coun-
tries — represented as a single economy — on the African economies. For the variables
for which it was possible, the European aggregates, i.d. the composite economic indices,
were built using the linear dynamic factor model methodology. Below we describe this
model in some detail.
The linear dynamic factor model,used as a tool of constructing the composite eco-
nomic indicator, was adopted by Stock and Watson (1989). We will denote it simply
as CEI. It is expressed as follows:
∆Yt = γ(L)∆Ct + ut (2)
∆Ct = µ +
p X
i=1
φi∆Ct−i + εt (3)
Ψ(L)ut = ηt (4)
where ∆ is the ﬁrst-order diﬀerence operator, Yt is the n × 1 vector of the observable
time series, Ct is the dynamic common factor in levels, ut is the n × 1 vector of the
idiosyncratic components, εt are the normally distributed residuals with unit variance
and zero mean while µ and φi (i = 1,2,...,p) are the common factor’s state-dependent
intercepts and autoregressive coeﬃcients, respectively.
The lag polynomial matrices of the speciﬁc factors, Ψj (j = 1,...,q), are diagonal.
The shocks to the speciﬁc factors are assumed to be serially and mutually uncorrelated
and normally distributed with unit variances and zero means: ηt ∼ NIID(On,Ση),
where On is the n × 1 vector of zeros and Ση is a n × n diagonal variance-covariance
matrix.
Here we estimate the linear model without intercept. This is admissible because
the data are previously demeaned.
To identify the model, Stock and Watson set the variance of the common factor
equal to one and assume that the lag polynomial matrices Ψj (j = 1,...,q, where the
q is the maximum autoregressive order of the speciﬁc components) are diagonal, thus
excluding any causality relationships between the idiosyncratic components.
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We recall that the relationships we are interested in are tested through two methods,
i.e, the (cross-)correlation coeﬃcients and the Granger causality tests. We admit a
robust comovement of cycles when Euro area and African country series are signi-
ﬁcantly correlated. The leading eﬀect of EBC is robust when the sign of maximum
cross-correlation (coeﬃcient) is conﬁrmed by Granger causality tests. The maximum
cross-correlation lag alone does not provide a robust evidence because signiﬁcance tests
can not be performed the related coeﬃcients. But, a (negative) lag for the maximum
cross-correlation coeﬃcient, accompanied by a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of contempora-
neous correlation, is accepted as a good indication of the EBC leading eﬀect. From
now on, we will sometimes use the term “lag” in its general sense like in the headers of
table columns. It will also refer to “lead” (positive lag).
Considering that the EMU versus Africa relationships are asymmetric in nature, we
will interpret signiﬁcant impacts of African economic variables on the EMU ones as a
result of world economic factors whose cycles coincide with those of African economy
variables.
5.1 Real Links
In this section, we will consider the relationships between the real economic indicators
— such as GDP, exports, relative wholesale prices, income terms of trade and terms
of trade — of Europe and Africa. Unfortunately, concerning the African countries,
we only have annual GDP series. Therefore, we are ﬁrstly bound to investigate the
links between the annual real European and African GDP on the one hand, and on the
other, between annual European wholesale prices and African GDP. Secondly, the links
between the European quarterly real GDP and the African quarterly terms of trade,
income terms of trade and real exports to Europe are examined. These latter links are
rather the indirect measures of the interdependence between the European and African
economies. However, they capture some of the important mechanisms of transmission
of the European economic events to the African economies.
5.1.1 European GDP versus African country GDPs
As an indicator of the European real GDP we used the Euro area GDP provided by
the OECD. The construction of the composite economic indicator was impeded by the
cointegration relationships between the component series, that is, the real annual GDP
of the member countries. We have found that the growth rates of these real GDP
were cointegrated, what makes the estimation of the dynamic factor model virtually
impossible. At least, for the moment, the literature does not propose any solutions to
the problem. On the other hand, we have the real GDP of the nine African countries:
Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo.
The sample covers the period 1970-2000.
Let us start by examining the time proﬁles of the variables of interest. Figure 7.1 in
Appendix 7.C compares the growth rate (ﬁrst-order diﬀerence of the natural logarithm)
12of Euro area real GDP, denoted as dEuro, to growth rate (ﬁrst-order diﬀerence of the
natural logarithm) of the real GDP in several European countries, which were used as
the component series.
Roughly speaking, the Euro area GDP displays a seemingly similar pattern with
the GDPs of at least France, Germany and Italy even though there are lags and leads at
some periods. To a lesser extent, the same similarity is also observed with the GDP of
Austria and Spain, however, only since the end of the seventies for the latter. We then
can consider that the EMU GDP is able to capture in a satisfactory way a common
component of the economic activity in the various country members. The failure to
build a composite economic indicator is then compensated by the use of the EMU GDP.
The relation of the European GDP with the GDP of other European countries is more
complicated, especially with Finland.
Figure 7.2 shows the growth rates of the African real GDPs compared to that of the
European real GDP. All the African countries, except Rwanda7, seem to have growth
rates whose volatility decreases over time. This is not the case of the European GDP.
There is no clear pattern of relationship between the European and African real annual
GDPs. Only Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo at some periods ﬂuctuate in the
same direction — sometimes with a lag or lead — as the European GDP. This predicts
a weak evidence of empirical relations. The common feature for these countries is that
their growth rates are more volatile than those of the Euro area GDP.
Let us start the quantitative analysis. First, we calculated the coeﬃcients of the
maximum cross-correlation and the contemporaneous correlation between the growth
rate of the Euro area GDP and the GDP growth rates of various African countries
across diﬀerent lags varying from -5 to 5. The same was also done between the growth
rate of France GDP and that of the same African countries.
The maximum correlation coeﬃcients and lags, which correspond to these coeﬃ-
cients, are reported in Table 5. The maximum attained at the negative lags means that
the Euro area real GDP is leading with respect to the corresponding African country.
The results obtained for the European GDP and the French GDP in terms of
maximum correlation lags are consistent to a some extent. Negative lags are found
for Ghana, Madagascar, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo. In all these cases, except those
of Rwanda and Togo, the correlations are negative. The highest (in absolute value)
correlation coeﬃcient is achieved for Ghana. Notice that on average the absolute values
of the correlation coeﬃcients are rather low, the highest being 0.49. As these maximum
correlation coeﬃcients do not allow us to draw reasonable conclusions, we will take into
account the suggested leading or lagging eﬀects that are accompanied either by the
presence of signiﬁcant contemporaneous coeﬃcients or by a conﬁrming Granger test
result.
The contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients show that only the GDP movements of
Ghana, Togo and Nigeria are positively correlated to that of the Euro area. Combining
this evidence with the possible leading eﬀect of the Euro area GDP mentioned above,
we can conclude that the EMU business cycle is signiﬁcantly leading those of Ghana
7There is an outlier in the real GDP series of Rwanda in 1994-1995.
13Table 5: Cross-correlation between the annual growth rates of Euro area real GDP
and African countries real GDPs
EMU GDP French GDP
Country Contempor. Maximum Contempor. Maximum
correlation correlation Lag correlation correlation Lag
Benin -0.117 -0.306 2 -0.149 -0.320 -1
Cameroon -0.235 0.283 5 -0.099 0.295 5
Congo -0.103 -0.454 1 0.068 -0.298 1
Ghana 0.429** -0.492 -3 0.303 -0.451 -3
Madagascar 0.066 -0.338 -5 0.089 -0.381 -4
Nigeria 0.315*** 0.404 2 0.238 0.394 2
Rwanda 0.054 0.346 -1 0.091 0.332 -1
Senegal -0.100 -0.360 -1 0.021 0.257 2
Togo 0.367** 0.390 -3 0.333*** -0.398 -3
Note 1: “Lag” stands for lag corresponding to maximum correlation.
Note 2: “*”, “**” and “***” denote the contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients which
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at respectively 1, 5 or 10% level.
and Togo. In the case of Ghana, this leading eﬀect is complex as the maximum and
the contemporaneous correlations are of diﬀerent signs.
The next step is to ﬁgure out the Granger-causality links. To do this, we have
estimated the bivariate VARs for the growth rates of the Euro area GDP and French
GDP, on the one hand, and the growth rates of the GDP of the nine African countries,
on the other hand. Each VAR included 4 lags.
Table 6: Granger-causality links between Euro area and African real GDP










Note: → is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in row to the variable in column (the former
causes the latter); ← is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in column to the variable in row;
↔ is the two-way Granger causality; × no Granger causality.
From the observation of Table 6, it turns out that the European and French GDP
“Granger cause” only the GDP of Madagascar. The two are not aﬀecting the gross
product of the countries which belong to the Franc zone. Other countries appear to
have economic dynamics which are not strongly inﬂuenced by the European economy.
14This is true at least at the annual level and for the overall measure of the economic
activity. Interestingly, the fact that EMU “Granger causes” Madagascar conﬁrms the
leading eﬀect suggested by the lag of the maximum cross-correlation.
Thus, the interaction between the North and the South found at the aggregate
level (Hoﬀmaister et al., 1998a) and with a calibrated model of a representative small
country (Kouparitsas, 1996) can not be conﬁrmed with all SSA’s country data. Only
the Ghana, Madagascar and Togo GDPs are inﬂuenced by the EMU GDP. Nigeria and
EMU GDPs are signiﬁcantly correlated but the former do not appear to be led by the
latter.
5.1.2 European Relative Wholesale Prices Versus African GDP
The European composite index of wholesale prices was constructed using a linear
dynamic factor model with the following seven component series: Austria, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and Spain. The limitation of the number of
series used is due to the lack of data. The estimated parameters of the static version
of the model8, along with their standard errors and p-values, are reported in Table
7.2 of Appendix 7.C. The EMU relative WPIs were built by dividing the composite
index-based European WPI by the consumer price index (a proxy of the WPI) of each
of the following seven African countries — Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo —, all being expressed in dollar. Furthermore, we have the
real GDP of the afore mentioned African economies. The sample starts in 1971 and
ﬁnishes in 1997.
We start again from examining the time proﬁles of the variables of interest. Figure
7.3 compares the growth rate (ﬁrst-order diﬀerence) of the composite index of the
European wholesale price, denoted as dEurope, to growth rate (ﬁrst-order diﬀerence of
the natural logarithm) of the wholesale prices in the European countries. The latter
served as the component series of the composite indicator.
The composite index shows a high degree of synchronicity with respect to most
wholesale price indices of the 7 European countries. It is especially true in the case of
Austria, Finland, France, and Germany, where the indices almost coincide.
Figure 7.4 shows the growth rates of the African real GDP compared to those of the
composite index of the European wholesale price indicator. There is no clear pattern
of relationship between the European relative wholesale prices and African real annual
GDP. Cameroon appears to follow the motions of the European wholesale prices with
some lag.
When doing the formal analysis we ﬁrst found the maximum cross-correlation be-
tween the growth rate of the European and French wholesale price indicators, on the
one hand, and the growth rates of the GDP of various African countries, on the other
hand, across diﬀerent lags varying from -4 to 4. The maximum correlation coeﬃcients
8Because of the reduced number of observations, we estimated a static version whose parameters
were used to build a composite index–based EMU relative WPI in dollar. The common factors derived
both from the dynamic and from the static version of the model are very similar.
15Table 7: Cross-correlation between the European relative wholesale price index and
the real GDP of the African countries
EMU relative WPI French relative WPI
Country Contempor. Maximum Contempor. Maximum
correlation correlation Lag correlation correlation Lag
Cameroon -0.278 -0.338 4 -0.214 -0.321 4
Ghana 0.214 0.338 1 0.209 0.348 1
Madagascar 0.061 -0.370 -4 0.121 -0.300 -4
Nigeria -0.014 -0.327 4 -0.023 -0.305 4
Rwanda 0.591* 0.591 0 0.570* 0.570 0
Senegal -0.090 -0.359 3 -0.114 -0.302 3
Togo 0.268 -0.748 1 0.351*** -0.662 1
Note 1: “Lag” stands for lag corresponding to maximum correlation.
Note 2: “*”, “**” and “***” denote the contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients which
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at respectively 1, 5 or 10% level.
and lags, which correspond to these coeﬃcients, as well as the contemporaneous corre-
lations are reported in Table 7.
The European relative wholesale price index seems to lead the real GDP of Mada-
gascar with the expected negative sign and is coincident with that of Rwanda, lagging
the real GDP of the other African countries. But, at this stage, the leading eﬀect on the
real GDP of Madagascar remains a simple indication to be conﬁrmed by a causality test
as the contemporaneous correlation is not signiﬁcant. There is only one contempora-
neous coeﬃcient which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, namely that of Rwanda. The
GDP of the latter is synchronous with the EMU relative wholesale prices, conﬁrming
that the Rwanda’s economic activity is positively and contemporaneously correlated
with EMU relative wholesale prices contrary to the theoretical relationships.
The next step is to ﬁgure out the Granger-causality links reported in Table 8. In
order to do this, we have estimated the bivariate VARs for the European relative WPI
and the French relative wholesale prices, on the one hand, and the growth rates of the
GDP of seven African countries, on the other hand. Each VAR included 4 lags.
It turns out that the European relative wholesale prices “Granger cause” Madaga-
scar, conﬁrming the indicative leading eﬀect suggested by the maximum cross-correlation
coeﬃcient analysis. Moreover, Rwanda’s GDP seems to be “Granger caused” by the
European relative WPI as suggested by correlation analysis. Surprisingly, the Euro-
pean relative price index is “Granger caused” by the ﬂuctuations of the real GDP of
Togo. This probably means that the economy of this country is positively correlated
with factors like international prices of primary goods which make prices move in EMU.
According to this, we can cautiously conclude that only two African countries’ GDP
in our sample, namely Madagascar and Rwanda, could be aﬀected by wholesale price
ﬂuctuations in Europe and are likely to be aﬀected by business cycle convergence in
the EMU.
16Table 8: Granger-causality links between European relative wholesale prices and
African real GDP








Note: → is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in row to the variable in column (the former
causes the latter); ← is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in column to the variable in row;
↔ is the two-way Granger causality; × no Granger causality.
5.1.3 European GDP Versus African Terms of Trade
This subsection tries to investigate the relationships between the European GDP and
the African terms of trade (TT). The latter are deﬁned as a ratio between the index
of the export prices of each African country and the index of the European export
prices. The European export price index is a weighted average of the indexes of 11
European countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Spain and UK9. The weight is the share of each particular country
in the total European exports to Africa. All the data are available at the quarterly
frequency. The sample starts in the ﬁrst quarter of 1980 and ends in the third quarter
of 2000.
As regards the Euro area GDP we have two series of data. First, we have access
to two series of the quarterly real GDP of the Euro area countries, namely: the oﬃcial
EMU GDP in euros with the base year 2001 (available for the period 1980:1-2003:3)
provided by the OECD and the Euro area real GDP (available for the period 1980:1-
2002:4) derived from the Euro Area-Wide Model (AWM) which has been constructed by
the staﬀ of the Econometric Modelling Division of the ECB (see Fagan et al., 2001). In
addition, we have attempted to estimate a composite index of the European GDP using
the linear dynamic factor analysis model. However, as explained above, this attempt
have failed because some series are cointegrated. There is a remarkable similarity
between the year-on-year growth rates of the two European GDP series. That is why
we are only going to use the oﬃcial Euro area’s real GDP series (the ﬁrst diﬀerences of
natural logarithms) through the rest of the real side analysis.
As usually, we computed ﬁrst contemporaneous and the maximum correlation coef-
ﬁcients and the corresponding lags in Table 9. The lags in the cross-correlation analysis
vary within the interval of [-10,10]. As the values of these correlation coeﬃcients are
low, it is also noticeable that these are all positive.
When considering the lags of maximum coeﬃcients, the probable leading eﬀect of
9The UK wholesale prices are highly correlated with those of the EMU country members.
17Table 9: Cross-correlation between the Euro area GDP and African terms of trade
Euro area GDP French GDP
Country Contempor. Maximum Contempor. Maximum
correlation correlation Lag correlation correlation Lag
Angola 0.212 0.250 -7 0.136 0.350 -6
Benin 0.126 0.266 4 -0.011 0.180 7
Cameroon 0.258 0.260 -1 0.213 0.312 10
Congo 0.200 0.254 -7 0.122 0.346 -6
Ivory Coast 0.194 0.217 1 0.074 0.172 -6
Gabon 0.222 0.248 -7 0.143 0.334 -6
Guinea 0.411** 0.420 1 0.331*** 0.341 1
Mali 0.125 0.233 3 0.014 0.151 -7
Niger 0.400** 0.406 1 0.313*** 0.320 1
Togo 0.425** 0.425 0 0.272 0.272 0
Note 1: “Lag” stands for lag corresponding to maximum correlation.
Note 2: “*”, “**” and “***” denote the contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients which are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at respectively 1, 5 or 10% level.
the quarterly European GDP is possible for the TT of four African countries: An-
gola, Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon. But the absence of signiﬁcant contemporaneous
correlation between the European GDP and the TT of these countries will mean the
rejection of the possible leading eﬀects if we fail to ﬁnd clearcut Granger causality
evidence below.
Table 10: Granger-causality links between Euro area GDP and African terms of trade











Note: → is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in row to the variable in column (the former
causes the latter); ← is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in column to the variable in row;
↔ is the two-way Granger causality; × no Granger causality.
From the observation of the contemporaneous correlations, we note that the EMU
is signiﬁcantly correlated to the TT of three African countries, namely Guinea, Niger
and Togo, the latter being synchronous with the EMU business cycle. The lags of
maximum correlation for the three countries suggest that the cycles of their TT lead
18the EMU business cycle.
To conduct the Granger-causality analysis reported in Table 10, we used the bivari-
ate VARs with 6 lags. The signiﬁcance level for the rejection of the null hypothesis
of no Granger causality was established at 10% level. Neither European GDP nor the
French GDP appear to “Granger cause” the TT of the African countries included in
our analysis.
Thus, the investigation of this channel of transmission does not reveal any leading
or causal eﬀect of the EMU business cycle on SSA’s country TT. Nevertheless, the TT
of Togo are likely to be inﬂuenced by the EBC because of the synchronicity observed
above.
5.1.4 European GDP Versus African Income Terms of Trade
In this subsection, the relationships between the European GDP and the African income
terms of trade (ITT) are examined. The ITT is the African nominal exports divided by
the European exports price index. It, thus, measures the quantity of goods and services
the African countries could buy in Europe using the revenues from their exports. As
in the previous section, the European export price index is computed as a weighted
average of the indexes of 11 European countries (see above). All the data are available
at the quarterly frequency. The sample covers the period of 1981:1-2000:3.
Table 11: Cross-correlation between the Euro area GDP and African income terms of
trade
Euro area GDP French GDP
Country Contempor. Maximum Contempor. Maximum
correlation correlation Lag correlation correlation Lag
Angola 0.426** 0.426 0 0.309*** 0.309 0
Benin -0.110 -0.282 4 -0.150 -0.388 3
Burkina Faso -0.049 0.484 7 -0.016 0.534 8
Cameroon 0.370** 0.384 1 0.127 0.193 1
CAR 0.210 -0.282 7 0.210 0.336 -1
Chad 0.115 -0.280 -8 0.048 -.196 -2
Comoros 0.191 0.373 -7 0.209 0.334 -1
Congo 0.026 0.318 -4 -0.011 0.142 7
Ivory Coast -0.019 -0.403 -9 -0.152 -0.326 -9
Gabon 0.517* 0.556 1 0.452* 0.467 1
Gambia 0.381** 0.443 -1 0.394** 0.438 -1
Guinea 0.165 -0.227 -6 0.021 0.189 -10
Guinea-Bissau -0.035 -0.206 8 -0.074 -0.246 10
Madagascar 0.009 -0.216 -5 0.072 0.184 -2
Mali 0.212 0.212 0 0.221 0.221 0
Mauritania 0.196 0.233 1 -0.050 0.203 -4
Niger 0.107 0.243 9 0.190 0.247 9
Nigeria 0.079 -0.298 9 -0.030 -0.276 -8
Sao Tome & P. 0.003 0.373 8 0.107 0.275 8
Senegal 0.022 0.411 7 0.193 0.436 -3
Sierra Leone 0.176 0.352 8 0.153 0.480 -8
Togo 0.300*** -0.349 -5 0.228 -0.265 -5
Note 1: “Lag” stands for lag corresponding to maximum correlation.
Note 2: “*”, “**” and “***” denote the contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients
which are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at respectively 1, 5 or 10% level.
In Table 11 we report the highest cross-correlations and (the corresponding lags)
between the OECD’s indicator of the Euro area real quarterly GDP, on the one hand,
and the income terms of trade of some African countries, on the other hand. As it can be
19Table 12: Granger-causality links between the Euro area GDP and African income
terms of trade
Country EMU GDP French GDP
Angola × ×
Benin ← →
















Sao Tome & Principe × ×
Senegal × ×
Sierra Leone × ×
Togo ← ←
Note: → is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in row to the variable in column (the former
causes the latter); ← is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in column to the variable in row;
↔ is the two-way Granger causality; × no Granger causality.
observed, only ITTs of ﬁve countries are signiﬁcantly and contemporaneously correlated
with the EBC. As the Angola ITT cycle is synchronous with the EBC, only that of
Gambia and Togo seem to be led by the EBC when combining the evidence of signi-
ﬁcant contemporaneous correlation and the information of maximum cross-correlation
coeﬃcients.
The causality analysis conﬁrms these ﬁndings. Table 12 shows the direction of
Granger causality (when it exists) between the Euro area (the indicator of the OECD)
and French GDP, on the one hand, and the income terms of trade of several African
countries, on the other. It is easily noticeable that only the results related to Gambia
and Togo are consistent with the correlation analysis of Table 11. Similarly, the cyclical
behavior of the Euro area GDP “Granger causes” the ITT of Benin, Burkina Faso and
Cameroon.
Thus, our analysis provide a clearcut stylized fact in regard of the impact — the
leading eﬀect — of European economic activity on the ITT of the studied SSA’s coun-
tries. The ability to ﬁnance imports of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gambia and
Togo will raise if the Euro area GDP increases. This ability will also raise in Angola;
but this will happen simultaneously with the Euro area GDP’s increase.
5.1.5 European GDP Versus African Real Exports
This subsection analyzes the relation between the European GDP and the African real
exports to Europe. The link between the African exports and the GDP of France
— which appears to exert an important inﬂuence on the African economies — is also
examined.
20Table 13: Cross-correlation between the European GDP and the real exports of
diﬀerent African countries
Euro area GDP French GDP
Country Contempor. Maximum Contempor. Maximum
correlation correlation Lag correlation correlation Lag
Angola 0.317*** 0.317 0 0.227 0.227 0
Benin -0.114 -0.305 4 -0.139 -0.395 3
Cameroon 0.232 0.254 1 -0.015 0.103 4
Congo -0.065 0.243 -4 -0.076 -0.202 7
Ivory Coast -0.092 -0.397 -9 -0.179 -0.310 2
Gabon 0.347*** 0.378 1 0.319*** 0.362 1
Guinea -0.082 -0.251 9 -0.165 0.216 -10
Mali 0.195 0.218 -1 0.213 0.223 -1
Niger 0.045 -0.202 -8 0.138 0.219 9
Togo 0.198 -0.272 -5 0.153 -0.228 -5
Note 1: “Lag” stands for lag corresponding to maximum correlation.
Note 2:“*”, “**” and “***” denote the contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients which are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at respectively 1, 5 or 10% level.
Figure 7.5 compares the year-on-year growth rates of the European real GDP to
those of the African real exports to Europe. The visual inspection of this ﬁgure reveals
no readily visible similarity between the European real GDP and the real exports of
the African countries. The African real exports appear to evolve in their own way.
Moreover, one cannot see any similarities between the African real exports themselves
when observing their patterns.
Table 13 reports the outcomes of the cross-correlation analysis. The maximum
correlations between the OECD’s Euro area GDP and French GDP, on the one hand,
and the GDP of 10 African countries, on the other hand, together with the related lags
or leads, are presented. The lags vary from -10 quarters to 10 quarters.
If one considers the maximum cross-correlation pattern, it will be noticed that
a leading eﬀect of European real GDP, to more deeply investigate, is possible on the real
exports Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Mali, and Togo. However, these correlations are weak
and in most of the cases are of the “wrong” sign; and no signiﬁcant contemporaneous
correlation support the possible leading eﬀects. Although, the EBC is synchronous
with real exports cycle of Angola. The positive correlation coeﬃcient is consistent with
the theoretical link.
Once again the bivariate vector autoregressions were used to check the hypotheses
of Granger causality between the European and French GDPs, on the one hand, and
the real exports of the African countries, on the other hand. The signiﬁcance level is
10%. Table 14 reports the results.
The European real GDP appears to “Granger cause” the real exports of Cameroon
whose real exports exhibit a mutual “Granger causation” relationship with the EBC. In
the case of France there is a two-way causality with Ivory Coast. In sum, the European
21Table 14: Granger-causality links between European GDP and African real exports to
Europe











Note: → is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in row to the variable in column (the former
causes the latter); ← is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in column to the variable in row;
↔ is the two-way Granger causality; × no Granger causality.
countries seem to exert little inﬂuence on the real exports of the African countries as
synchronicity is only observed with real exports of one country of our sample; and
Granger causality is also signiﬁcant for one country.
5.2 Monetary Links
We are going to study the monetary links between Europe and Africa using the following
data: the inﬂation rates for 10 African countries (Cameroon, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo) and 11 European countries
(Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain). The sample begins in the second quarter of 1970 and ends in
the last quarter of 2002. Consumer prices are chosen as proxies of monetary policy
indicators in order to readily compare the European and the African policies; because
the comparability of other data like interest rates is limited10.
We have estimated a dynamic factor model of the inﬂations of the 12 EMU mem-
bers, namely: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The common factor is treated as an
aggregate of the European consumer price growth rate or, in other words, the aggre-
gate of the European inﬂation rate. The estimated parameters of the common dynamic
model of the European CPI are reported in Table 7.3 of Appendix 7.C.
Our composite indicator (Euro CI) has been compared to the year-on-year growth
rate of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices provided by the current Euro area
AWM (Euro HICP) on Figure 7.6. The similarity is striking: the levels are diﬀerent,
but the ups and downs of both indices are synchronous. This gives an additional
support to our indicator.
10The speciﬁc treatments of data are documented in Appendix 7.B.
22Table 15: The cross-correlations between the European aggregate of inﬂation and the
annual inﬂation rates in the African countries
Euro area CPI French CPI
Country Contempor. Maximum Contempor. Maximum
correlation correlation Lag correlation correlation Lag
Cameroon 0.636* 0.644 -1 0.685* 0.686 -1
Gabon 0.689* 0.730 -3 0.646* 0.687 -3
Gambia 0.068 0.344 -10 0.080 0.364 -10
Ghana 0.411** 0.530 -6 0.437** 0.507 -7
Ivory Coast 0.597* 0.597 0 0.616* 0.638 3
Madagascar 0.327*** 0.338 2 0.357** 0.363 -1
Niger 0.595* 0.599 -1 0.559* 0.575 6
Nigeria -0.170 -0.428 10 -0.239 -0.336 -8
Senegal 0.673* 0.693 -1 0.642* 0.681 -2
Togo 0.369** 0.372 -1 0.314*** 0.318 -1
Note 1: “Lag” stands for lag corresponding to maximum correlation.
Note 2: “*”, “**” and “***” denote the contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients which
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at respectively 1, 5 or 10% level.
Next the year-on-year diﬀerences — that is, the value of inﬂation of the ﬁrst quarter
of year t minus the value of inﬂation of the ﬁrst quarter of year t − 1 of the factor as
well as the inﬂation rates of all the 21 countries were calculated. Figures 7.7 and 7.8
compare the year-on-year rates of the European composite CPI, representing the Euro-
pean inﬂation, to the annual inﬂation rates in several European and African countries,
respectively. We can see that there is a synchronicity of the aggregate European CPI
and most of the European countries CPIs.
Figure 7.8 shows that the inﬂation in Africa exhibits a declining trend like the
European CPI, suggesting that the European disinﬂation policy has been transmitted
to Africa. In addition, despite the fact that the African CPIs seem more volatile than
that of European Union, the variability of their cyclical components appear to decrease
over time.
Then we computed the cross-correlations between the European aggregate and the
annual inﬂation rates in each African country with the lags varying from -10 to +10.
The results of the cross-correlation analysis between Europe and the African countries,
on the one hand, and between France and the African countries, on the other hand, are
summarized in Table 15. In order to get some idea about the impact of the outliers in
1994-1995 on the cross-correlations, we have put the correlations estimated for the data
with outliers in the parentheses near to the correlations estimated for the data without
outliers. The main result is that the European monetary policy leads the SSA’countries
one, especially for CFA zone members. Indeed, it could be noticed that the European
CPI leads the inﬂation in Cameroon, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal and Togo
which are CFA zone members and Ghana. Among CFA zone members, only Togo has
a correlation coeﬃcient less than 0.5.
23Table 16: Granger-causality links between the European, the French, the US and the
African inﬂation series
Country European CPI French CPI US CPI
Cameroon ← × ×
Ivory Coast ← × ←
Gabon ← ← ×
Gambia × × ×
Ghana ← ← ←
Madagascar × × ×
Niger ← × ×
Nigeria × × ×
Senegal ← ← ←
Togo × × ×
Note: → is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in row to the variable in column (the former
causes the latter); ← is the one-way Granger causality going from the variable in column to the variable in row;
↔ is the two-way Granger causality; × no Granger causality.
The Granger causality tests conﬁrm that the European CPI causes the CPIs of
Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Niger , Senegal and Ghana which is not a CFA zone
member11 (see Table 16). The lags of maximum correlation suggest that African coun-
tries have the possibility to leave their inﬂation above the European inﬂation before
adjusting it. For CFA zone members that peg their single currency to the euro, this is
possible because of the operation account mechanism (Nyembwe, 2003). We can, thus,
conclude that a transmission of economic shocks from the EMU to the SSA’s coun-
tries is possible but it will probably be delayed as long as an operation account–like
mechanism holds.
The same exercise was conducted with the European aggregate of inﬂation replaced
by the French inﬂation rate.
5.3 A “Country Speciﬁc” Digression
The above analysis shows that only a few African country GDPs and other economic
variables are likely to be aﬀected by the EBC. Here we attempt to do a “transver-
sal reading” of the collected evidence in order to highlight the extent to which each
concerned country is aﬀected through the various variables we took into account. Un-
fortunately, the lack of data does not allow the observation of all the studied correlations
for each country.
When considering annual data, we notice that only the GDP of Ghana, Madagascar
and Togo seem to be led by the EMU GDP. For Ghana, one channel through which
this correlation works is the monetary policy. The EMU monetary policy seems to
lead the one of Ghana even though monetary authorities of the latter did not commit
themselves to peg the domestic currency to the euro.
11For the sake of comparison, we included in our analysis the US inﬂation indicator.
24As regards Togo, the synchronicity of the EBC with the TT we highlighted by the
way of cross-correlation analysis suggests that the TT are a channel of transmission of
EMU economic activity impact. It is also interesting to notice that the ITT are led
by the EBC. Thus, an increase of economic activity in EMU causes Togo’s ability to
ﬁnance import to raise. Considering that real exports are not aﬀected at all by the
EBC, we can conclude that for Togo, the supply side factors, namely TT, appear to be
the main channel of transmission of the EBC. The monetary policy of EMU is another
channel of transmission as the CPI of Togo is led by that of EMU.
Madagascar also deserves a bit of attention. The impact of the EMU GDP on its
GDP seems to work through the EMU wholesale prices. This GDPs’ correlation is
probably negative when considering the maximum cross-correlation coeﬃcient in line
with the negative impact of EMU relative WPI. The income terms of trade do not
appear to be the way by which the EMU GDP ﬂuctuations have an impact on the
GDP of Madagascar.
Cameroon is an interesting case in the sense that it is included in all the samples
we have. Despite the absence of GDPs’ relationships evidence, the EBC appears to
be correlated with the ITT and the real exports when considering either the cross
correlation or the Granger causality test results. Nevertheless, it does not seem to have
any clearcut EBC leading eﬀect on Cameroon’s variables as the interpretation of the
various results is not easy. Finally, the monetary policy appears also to be a channel
of transmission of monetary shocks to Cameroon, even if the evidence of its impact on
the GDP is not available.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have empirically examined the relationships between the European
Union economic activity and SSA’s countries, as the newly born EMU is their main
trading partner. The aim is to be able to answer the question whether the emergence
of a European business cycle (EBC) — that is the result of convergence of national
business cycles in the EMU — is likely to matter for these African countries. Answering
the question could be given by the investigation of the empirical impact of EBC on
SSA’s economic variables.
Relying on the existing literature that shows the existence of a EBC, we have as-
sumed that a common feature of the EMU members’ economic variables is an accurate
expression of the underlying convergence process. Adapting the Stock and Watson
method to estimate composite economic indicators whose components are similar vari-
ables of the various EMU members’ economies, we have estimated composite indexes of
real GDPs, wholesale and consumer prices. Unfortunately, the composite index of the
European real GDPs was not possible to construct. To replace it, the European area
GDP provided by the OECD has been used. It appears to exhibit an annual pattern
quite similar to those of EMU members’ GDPs.
In this study, each theoretical link conﬁrmed both by the cross-correlation and the
Granger causality is robust. The evidence provided either by the cross-correlation ana-
25lysis when the contemporaneous coeﬃcient was signiﬁcant or by the Granger causality
tests is also valid. After highlighting the theoretical channels of transmission, we tested
them and obtained the following results:
• The analysis made with annual data shows that only GDP of Ghana, Madagascar
and Togo appear to be inﬂuenced by the EBC. This relation is complex in the
case of Ghana, as the leading eﬀect is initially negative before becoming positive.
• The cyclical component of European relative wholesale prices seems to lead only
the one of Madagascar GDP while it is correlated with that of Rwanda GDP.
• The EBC seems to have no leading eﬀect on any African country terms of trade
(TT), but it is synchronous with TT of Togo and positively correlated with Guinea
and Niger. The cycle of the two latter seems to lead the EBC.
• In regard to the income terms of trade, the EBC has a leading impact on Gambia
and Togo — whose correlations are very robust — and is synchronous with that
of Angola. The ITT of Benin, Burkina Faso and Cameroon are “Granger caused”
by the EBC.
• There is no robust leading eﬀect of the EBC on real exports of SSA’s countries,
except for Angola whose exports cycle is synchronous with EBC.
• Apart from Nigeria and Gambia cases, it exists a correlation between the Eu-
ropean and the studied Sub-Saharan African countries’ inﬂations. This link is
robust for Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, Niger, and Senegal. It is also
acceptable for Togo
We can therefore conclude that the cyclical component of economic activity in
the EMU is likely to have only a limited impact on a few African countries. On the
monetary side, there is a robust link between some SSA’s countries and European
monetary policies but, because of the lagged impact, it is reasonable to think that
these countries are somewhat insulated from immediate impact of monetary shocks
in Europe. As far as CFA zone countries are concerned, a reason of this situation
is the existence of the operation account mechanism that allows to peg the domestic
currency to the euro while the inﬂation pattern diﬀers momentarily from the anchor
country’s one. Hence, according to the available data and methods used in our study,
it is reasonable to suggest that a further convergence of national business cycles in
Europe, if it occurs, could matter for a few African countries.
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297 Appendix
Appendix 7.A Sources of Data
Here are the sources of data we have used.
• The quarterly real GDP indexes of European countries are taken from Thomson
Data Stream (TDS) while the quarterly Euro area GDP series are obtained from
OEDC.
• Annual GDPs for African countries come from the IMF data collected by the
TDS. They are obtained with the code Country code I99BVPH. The European
countries real GDP series are provided by the ODCE.
• The European producer prices, wholesale prices and unit value of exports, for
France, are obtained from the IMF IFS (June 2001). The country names and the
related codes are respectively Austria,12263...ZF; Belgium, 12463...ZF; Finland,
17263...ZF; Germany, 13463...ZF; Greece, 17463...ZF; Ire-
land, 17863...ZF; Italy, 13663...ZF; Netherlands, 13863...ZF; Spain, 18463...ZF;
France, 13274...ZF. They are used as proxies of export prices.
• The value exports of African countries series expressed in dollar are obtained
from the IMF, Direction of Trade (DOT) CD-ROM of June 2001. The prices of
African exports are constructed as a combination of commodity prices (by groups)
obtained in the DTS and the commodity groups shares in total exports of African
countries. The latter are provided by the UNCTAD handbook of Statistics.
• African quarterly series of consumer price indexes (CPI) are obtained from the
TDS with the code Country code164...F while European CPI are obtained from
the IMF (IFS of February 2004).
Appendix 7.B Treatment of Data on Monetary Links
There is in data an important but short-lived shock for the countries of the Franc zone
and for Madagascar related to the adjustments of their currencies’ exchange rates. We
had to use the dummy variables in order to eliminate the eﬀects of this shock. Each
dummy was deﬁned in the following way: Ft = 1, if there is a shock, Ft = 0, otherwise.
The dates for each country, when the shock occurred, are indicated in Table 7.1. The
linear regressions were estimated with a single regressor — the dummy variable. The
residuals of these regressions are the transformed series (without the outliers), which
we are going to use below.
In the six cases there are missing observations, namely: Cameroon 2002:1-2002:4,
Gabon 2001:1-2002:4, Gambia 2001:2-2002:4, Nigeria 2001:3, and Togo 1995:1-1995:2.
In the case missing observations are in the beginning or in the end of the sample, we
have used only the data after or before the missing ones. As regards Togo, we replaced
the missing observations by the average value computed for the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the









inﬂation rate for the period 1971:2-1994:4. It is somewhat arbitrary, but acceptable as
a ﬁrst approximation.
Appendix 7.C Tables and Figures
Table 7.2: Estimated parameters of the annual composite index of European
wholesale prices 1965-1998. Log-likelihood: -194.61
Parameters Coeﬃcient St. error t-stat p-value
γAus 0.979 0.122 8.04 0.0
γFin 0.770 0.143 5.39 0.0
γFra 0.940 0.126 7.44 0.0
γGer 0.978 0.122 8.02 0.0
γIre 0.903 0.131 6.92 0.0
γNeth 0.977 0.122 8.01 0.0
γSpa 0.860 0.135 6.37 0.0
σAus 0.0105 0.005 2.26 0.018
σFin 0.377 0.094 4.01 0.000
σFra 0.086 0.023 3.78 0.000
σGer 0.013 0.005 2.53 0.010
σIre 0.155 0.039 3.96 0.000
σNeth 0.015 0.006 2.75 0.006
σSpa 0.231 0.006 4.00 0.000
Note: ”St. error” is the standard error of the estimated coeﬃcient, ”t-stat” is the t statistic of the estimated
coeﬃcient, ”p-value” is the probability of the estimated coeﬃcient.
31Table 7.3: Estimated parameters of the quarterly composite index of European CPI
1970:1-2002:4. Log-likelihood: -1688.8718702
Coeﬃcient St. error t-stat p-value
γAus 0.401 0.068 5.88 0.0
γBel 0.177 0.073 2.42 0.009
γFin 0.349 0.079 4.41 0.0
γFra 0.544 0.078 6.97 0.0
γGer 0.326 0.083 3.92 0.0
γGre 0.019 0.101 0.19 0.425
γIre 0.393 0.064 6.14 0.0
γIt 0.392 0.077 5.10 0.0
γLux 0.416 0.074 5.65 0.0
γNeth 0.104 0.070 1.48 0.071
γPort 0.278 0.078 3.59 0.0
γSpa 0.175 0.066 2.66 0.005
φ 0.687 0.079 8.75 0.0
ψAus -0.038 0.130 -0.30 0.384
ψBel 0.035 0.178 0.20 0.421
ψFin 0.032 0.227 0.14 0.445
ψFra 0.296 0.107 2.76 0.003
ψGer 0.218 0.090 2.41 0.009
ψGre 0.261 0.088 2.96 0.002
ψIre -0.168 0.099 -1.70 0.046
ψIt 0.295 0.093 3.19 0.001
ψLux 0.091 0.099 0.91 0.182
ψNeth -0.018 0.179 -0.10 0.461
ψPort 0.142 0.090 1.59 0.058
ψSpa -0.081 0.087 -0.94 0.176
σAus 0.686 0.094 7.32 0.0
σBel 0.933 0.116 8.05 0.0
σFin 0.755 0.102 7.38 0.0
σFra 0.417 0.073 5.72 0.0
σGer 0.782 0.102 7.68 0.0
σGre 0.921 0.113 8.18 0.0
σIt 0.682 0.093 7.32 0.0
σIre 0.591 0.082 7.22 0.0
σLux 0.665 0.092 7.25 0.0
σNeth 0.972 0.119 8.15 0.0
σPort 0.830 0.106 7.82 0.0
σSpa 0.927 0.115 8.06 0.0
Note: ”St. error” is the standard error of the estimated coeﬃcient, ”t-stat” is the t statistic of the estimated
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